Early Admissions at Selective Colleges

Avery, Christopher; Levin, Jonathan

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Early Admissions at Selective Colleges

NBER Working Paper No. w14844

38 Pages Posted: 7 Apr 2009 Last revised: 23 Jan 2022

See all articles by Christopher Avery

Christopher Avery

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jonathan Levin

Stanford Graduate School of Business; Stanford University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: April 2009

Abstract

Early admissions is widely used by selective colleges and universities. We identify some basic facts about early admissions policies, including the admissions advantage enjoyed by early applicants and patterns in application behavior, and propose a game-theoretic model that matches these facts. The key feature of the model is that colleges want to admit students who are enthusiastic about attending, and early admissions programs give students an opportunity to signal this enthusiasm.

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Avery, Christopher and Levin, Jonathan D., Early Admissions at Selective Colleges (April 2009). NBER Working Paper No. w14844, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1372948